Law Enforcement

The existing paradigm for the economic analysis of tax compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue collection process. Even as a purely economic model, its exclusive focus on individual taxpayers' decision-making promotes an unduly restrictive vision of the compliance problem and potential responses to it. In this paper we outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for analyzing tax compliance, and illustrate it with a simple model. We believe our approach to be a significant improvement in the economic theory of law enforcement because it views the noncompliance problem as an interactive system. In our theoretical construct, individual decision-making not only depends upon and responds to the detection and punishment structure, but, unlike prior models, we also explicitly include the law enforcement agency--in this case the Internal Revenue Service--as an important interactive element. Initially we outline our general approach and its differences from the existing economic law enforcement paradigm. We then detail a simple model and its results and compare these results both to the prior literature and to some of our ongoing research in an effort to illustrate how our theoretical construct may affect predictions. Finally, we describe potential extensions of the model, examine its robustness with respect to various underlying assumptions and offer suggestions for further research, including possible applications to other law enforcement contexts.

The economic literature on optimal law enforcement is very recent. Becker's seminal paper on crime and law enforcement dates from 1968 and most papers which are the focus of this survey have been published in the last ten years. The core result presented by Becker is the following: the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime. Therefore, the fine should be maximal since it is a costless transfer whereas the probability of detection and conviction is costly. Much of the recent work has attempted to show why Becker's result may not hold. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

This article describes the impact of street-level law enforcement on Australia's principal heroin market. Based on three years of research, including interviews and extended ethnographic fieldwork, it uses data on drug-use, risk practices, crime, and policing to examine the relationship between law enforcement and harm minimization. Findings suggest that the 'successes' of police crackdowns and their impact on drug markets (including threats to public health and community safety as a result of geographical, social, and substance displacement) may be won at substantial costs, raising doubts as to their value.

A survey of 558 mental health and law enforcement professionals assessed current and past trauma experiences, exposure to traumatic client material, and the sequelae of both types of personal and professional trauma experiences. Results indicated that 29.8% of therapists and 19.6% of officers reported experiencing some form of childhood trauma.

WHEN society endeavors to control undesirable behavior, it employs methods that differ in fundamental ways, and one wonders why it has made the choices that it evidently has. Why should society sometimes engage in outright prevention of acts-as when a policeman stops a person from shooting a gun-and other times employ the threat of sanctions to deter unwanted behavior-as when the state exacts fines for violation of safety regulations or imposes liability for causing harm? And when sanctions are applied, why should they sometimes be monetary in nature and at other times take the form of imprisonment? Further, why should society sometimes rely on private citizens to report violations of law, as happens under the tort system, and at other times resort to police or other public enforcement agents for that purpose? I will suggest in this article that these basic questions about the observed structure of law enforcement can be answered by reference to the theoretically optimal structure of enforcement; the actual pattern of enforcement seems to be broadly consistent with the pattern that is most effective in theory. To this end, I begin in Section I by defining socially desirable and socially undesirable acts. Next, in Section II, I set out what may be considered the principal dimensions of law enforcement and then describe important means of enforcement (including tort law, criminal law, and safety regulation) in terms of these dimensions. In Section III, I consider the determination of the theoretically optimal structure of en-

In March and October 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and CDC, respectively, issued nationwide alerts identifying illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF) as a threat to public health and safety (1,2). IMF is unlawfully produced fentanyl, obtained through illicit drug markets, includes fentanyl analogs, and is commonly mixed with or sold as heroin (1,3,4). Starting in 2013, the production and distribution of IMF increased to unprecedented levels, fueled by increases in the global supply, processing, and distribution of fentanyl and fentanyl-precursor chemicals by criminal organizations (3). Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid 50-100 times more potent than morphine (2).* Multiple states have reported increases in fentanyl-involved overdose (poisoning) deaths (fentanyl deaths) (2). This report examined the number of drug products obtained by law enforcement that tested positive for fentanyl (fentanyl submissions) and synthetic opioid-involved deaths other than methadone (synthetic opioid deaths), which include fentanyl deaths and deaths involving other synthetic opioids (e.g., tramadol). Fentanyl deaths are not reported separately in national data. Analyses also were conducted on data from 27 states(†) with consistent death certificate reporting of the drugs involved in overdoses. Nationally, the number of fentanyl submissions and synthetic opioid deaths increased by 426% and 79%, respectively, during 2013-2014; among the 27 analyzed states, fentanyl submission increases were strongly correlated with increases in synthetic opioid deaths. Changes in fentanyl submissions and synthetic opioid deaths were not correlated with changes in fentanyl prescribing rates, and increases in fentanyl submissions and synthetic opioid deaths were primarily concentrated in eight states (high-burden states). Reports from six of the eight high-burden states indicated that fentanyl-involved overdose deaths were primarily driving increases in synthetic opioid deaths. Increases in synthetic opioid deaths among high-burden states disproportionately involved persons aged 15-44 years and males, a pattern consistent with previously documented IMF-involved deaths (5). These findings, combined with the approximate doubling in fentanyl submissions during 2014-2015 (from 5,343 to 13,882) (6), underscore the urgent need for a collaborative public health and law enforcement response.

Community policing creates the expectation that oficers will become more selective in making arrests and that those decisions will be influenced more by extralegal considerations and less by legal ones. Data on 451 nontraffic police-suspect encounters were drawn from ridealong observations in Richmond, Virginia, where the police department was implementing community policing. The arrest/no arrest decision is regressed on variables representing legal and extralegal characteristics of the situation. Legal variables show much stronger effects than extralegal ones, but that depends upon the officer's attitude toward community policing. Supporters of community policing are, as predicted, more selective in making arrests and much less influenced by legal variables than are officers with negative views. However, pro-community-policing officers are like negative officers in the extent of influence exerted by extralegal factors. There are some differences between the two groups of officers on the strength and direction of effects of predictor variables taken individually, but only 1 of 17 is significant. Thus, in a time of community policing, officers who support it do manifest some arrest decision patterns distinguishable from those of colleagues who adhere to a more traditional view of law enforcement.

THE CELLER-KEFAUVER AMENDMENT of 1950 revitalized the antimerger statute contained in Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' An unparalleled wave of merger activity after this revision [17] was accompanied by an acceleration of antimerger law enforcement activities [21]. Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, there has been no systematic attempt to ascertain the effects of the enforcement experience on the wealth position of affected stockholders. This paper examines the risk and return characteristics of 205 large corporations whose merger activities were challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission over the period 1950-1972. The stock price and dividend records of these companies are examined for evidence of abnormal rate of return behaviour before and after the issuance of Section 7 complaints. The impact of the divestiture program is studied and comparisons are made to the returns realized by stockholders in companies whose merger activity was not challenged under the antitrust law. The following section presents some competing hypotheses on the relationships between merger activity, antitrust enforcement and the pattern of stockholder returns. Research methodology, data sources, and sample selection are discussed in Section II and in the Appendix. The empirical evidence is presented and analyzed in Section III. The results are summarized in Section IV.

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, major government efforts to modernize federal law enforcement authorities' intelligence collection and processing capabilities have been initiated. At the state and local levels, crime and police report data is rapidly migrating from paper records to automated records management systems in recent years, making them increasingly accessible.

International concern about illegal forestry activities has grown markedly. Asian, African, and European governments have held high-level regional conferences on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG). Indonesia has signed path-breaking Memoranda of Understanding on illegal logging with the United Kingdom, China, and Norway. The Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Forum on Forests, the International Tropical Timber Organisation, and the G8 have all issued forceful statements, and incorporated the issue in their work plans. The European Commission has committed itself to formulating a European FLEG Action Plan. Japan and Indonesia have initiated an Asian Forest Partnership, with a major focus on illegal logging. Global Witness, the Environmental Investigation Agency, Transparency International, Greenpeace, Global Forest Watch, and Friends of the Earth have raised public awareness about the problem.